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make us feel good-and, based as it is on little or no evidence, it should disappear from scholarly discourse. It certainly shouldn't be propped up by citations in the Harvard Law Review. As a "scholarly" doctrine, the thesis is generally the product of a few writers citing each other back and forth, and wrenching founding-era (and other) quotations out of context, in support of otherwise unsupportable positions. 7 Members of Congress have done the quotation-wrenching as well, 8 and some tribal officials have wrongheadedly jumped on the influence-thesis bandwagon.
9
The thesis is dumb, but it also should have been irrelevant to the argument advanced in the Developments chapter. (If that argument does depend on such questionable authority, it's grounded in quicksand.) In support of the proposition that tribal governments deserve deference in applying ICRA, the authors argued that the American colonists mindlessly resisted the idea that the American Indian nations had laws and governments worth paying attention to, 10 and we continue to resist today. Fair enough (perhaps), but the influence thesis doesn't support those points. The Developments authors seem to have been of two minds-that the American colonists didn't value tribal laws and governments, yet the founders appropriated Indian political ideas to use in the Constitution. Those two propositions can't both be right.
To be sure, the Developments authors didn't explicitly say they were endorsing the influence thesis. But, if they weren't, why cite to material that (1) overstates the tribal influence on the founding and (2) is, or should be, irrelevant to the argument being advanced? What's included in footnotes matters, as editors and associates at the Bluebook's home surely know, and these citations seem to have been motivated by political correctness, not scholarly merit.
11
In the first two parts of the article I examine in some detail a couple of the suspect footnotes. (That sounds excruciatingly boring, I know, but it's no more so than any other law review subject.) In part III, I add further thoughts about why the influence thesis should be summarily rejected. Finally, in the conclusion, I note that the influence thesis has potentially negative effects on the American government's conception of, and policy toward, American Indian nations-another reason the thesis should be interred, not celebrated. See, e.g., infra note 40 (noting academic historian's presentation to congressional committee of misleading quotation from George Washington); infra note 49 (noting independent historian's misleading statement of legislative history).
8
See infra text accompanying note 35. 9 See infra notes 64 & 71 and accompanying text. The officials apparently see a tribal benefit from the thesis, but there's no long-term benefit in supporting an indefensible thesis. 10 See, e.g., Developments, at 1711 ("[T] he governments that arrived in North America searched for the particular forms of law and government with which they were familiar and, finding them lacking, sought to impose civilization and order (of their own style) upon tribes.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 1710 ("European and American distrust of, or disinterest [sic] in, Indian tribal affairs led them to apply their laws and philosophies to the exclusion of Indians' own views in those areas.") (footnote omitted).
11
Or maybe everyone was too busy writing Supreme Court clerkship applications to do routine Review work.
i. fooTnoTe 7
Footnote 7 in the Developments chapter was dropped from a clause that reads, "Indians had successfully designed and developed advanced governments and laws to protect the rights of their peoples long before the federal government thought to suggest these institutions to tribes." 12 That's true, up to a point, I suppose. I'm not sure how much traditional tribal governments were instituted to protect individual rights against overreaching by those governments, or the extent to which we should treat customs and practices as "advanced laws." But for the sake of argument I'll accept that textual statement.
13
But footnote 7 went far beyond the idea that the tribes had governments and laws, as of course they did. The authors cited and quoted from two sources that are among the usual suspects in supporting the influence thesis-a 1751 (or perhaps 1750) letter from Benjamin Franklin to James Parker and a 1988 Concurrent Resolution passed by Congress. Neither citation provides support for much of anything worthwhile-the Franklin letter because the quoted language gives a misleading idea of Franklin's meaning and the Concurrent Resolution because it's nonsense on stilts promulgated by a political body, not a group of scholars.
A. the FrAnklin letter
In the letter to Parker, according to footnote 7, Franklin "observed . . . that the success of the Iroquois Confederacy, which 'has subsisted ages, and appears indissoluble,' demonstrated the feasibility of union for the colonies."
14 That statement supposedly supported the idea that, "[i]n fact, tribal governments had an impact on the development of the federal government."
15
Read in isolation, that latter statement is unobjectionable. Obviously the Constitution was affected, in that Indians and Indian tribes are both mentioned in that document. 16 those constitutional provisions.) Furthermore, the founders, who were students of government, prided themselves on their study of other regimes, so it's not surprising that many were interested in the governance (or, as some thought, the lack of governance) of American Indian nations. 17 (In that respect, ancient Greece and the Roman Empire also had "an impact on the development of the federal government.") And of course the colonists and the tribes had contact, but those meetings (or confrontations) typically didn't involve discussions of political philosophy.
18
The gulf between general statements about colonist-tribal relationships and the purported influence of the Iroquois Confederacy is enormous. In fact, the contact between colonists and Indians often wasn't friendly, which by itself should call into question the influence thesis. [Kennedy] , that securing the Friendship of the Indians is of the greatest Consequence to these colonies; and that the surest Means of doing it, are, to regulate the Indian Trade, so as to convince them, by cl. 3 ("excluding Indians not taxed" from the census count used to apportion representatives and direct taxes).
17
See supra note 13 (noting that, for some from the founding generation, the existence of tribal governments and laws wasn't obvious). League, 35 eThnohisTory 305, 327 (1988) (noting that Franklin wasn't identified as the letter's author for a century, which suggests that we should be skeptical about overstating its influence during the founding period); Editor's Biographical Note, Franklin Letter, supra note 14, at 117 (noting attribution of the letter to Franklin by Edward Eggleston in a note to John Bigelow, who was preparing an edition of Franklin's work that was published in 1887-88).
Experience, that they may have the best and cheapest Goods, and the fairest Dealing from the English; and to unite the several Governments, so as to form a Strength that the Indians may depend on for Protection, in Case of a Rupture with the French; or apprehend great Danger from, if they should break with us.
23
As the last clause confirms, Franklin didn't think that the relationship between colonists and Indian nations was necessarily friendly. Friendship wasn't a given; it needed to be "secur [ed] ." And the title of the Kennedy pamphlet also suggested that it was necessary to "gain" the friendship of the Indians.
24
The tension between tribes and colonists didn't disappear during the time between the publication of the Franklin letter and the Constitutional Convention. The sometimes unfriendly relationships continued to make unification of the colonies close to a necessity. Much of the original legislation emanating from Congress, after ratification of the Constitution, was directed at Indian affairs because of the potentially hostile tribes at the frontier, not because of admiration for the native peoples. In short, strengthening the central government would make it possible to deal with the "merciless Indian Savages" Thomas Jefferson had referred to in the Declaration of Independence 25 -or the "savage tribes," Hamilton's term in The Federalist.
26 (Would a rational new nation take its governing principles from merciless savages or savage tribes?)
Despite occasional intimations in the literature to the contrary, Franklin's statement about the Iroquois Confederacy included in the Parker letter-that the Confederacy "has subsisted ages, and appears indissoluble"-wasn't made at the 1754 Albany Congress. 27 That congress is often cited as the start of the serious push for confederation, and it was attended by many representatives of Indian nations, particularly from the Iroquois Confederacy. 28 See The federaLisT no. 24, at 61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies . . . . Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small Garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.
27
See wiLLiam n. fenTon, The greaT Law and The Longhouse: a poLiTicaL hisTory of The iroquois confederacy 471 (1998).
28
Indian nations, particularly the Iroquois, were represented in Albany, although not in the numbers that might have been expected. See TimoThy J. shannon, indians and coLonisTs express support for unification of a sort, as he had in the letter to Parker. But, as the title of the Kennedy pamphlet suggests, it was the "British interest" that was to be protected-unification within the British Empire, not the creation of a new united states. 29 Historian Timothy Shannon has explained, "Identifying Franklin or any other supporter of the Albany Plan as an embryonic American patriot in 1754 is misguided; quite to the contrary, his primary objective was to place the Crown's American subjects on a more equal footing with those of Britain."
30
Most important, the Franklin quotation in its unedited form-decidedly not the form intimated by footnote 7-doesn't come close to supporting the influence thesis:
It would be a very strange Thing if six Nations of ignorant Savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for such an Union, and be able to execute it in such a Manner, as that is has subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble; and yet that a like Union should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English colonies.
31
That's hardly a positive statement about Iroquois principles. 32 Yes, Franklin urged consolidation of the colonies, but his urging was in the nature of "if even the [T]he incorporation of such concepts as freedom of speech, the separation of powers in government and the balance of power within government so impressed Benjamin Franklin that he challenged the colonists to create a similar united government when he stated: "It would be a strange thing if the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy * * * should be capable of forming * * * such a union * * * and yet a like union should be impracticable for * * * a dozen English colonies."
35
But Franklin mentioned none of those concepts (freedom of speech, etc.) in his letter to Parker-that wasn't the reason for the letter-and the strategically placed asterisks turned the language quoted from the letter upside down.
36 I'd like to be able to assume that dishonesty wasn't involved in editing the language for inclusion in the House Report, just a high level of enthusiasm about a fashionable idea. But the resulting misrepresentation was so great that such an assumption is hard to make.
That's one of the reasons the citation to House Concurrent Resolution 331 in footnote 7 was bizarre. In that resolution, as noted, Congress had "recogniz[ed] the influence of 'the Iroquois Confederacy and other Indian Nations [on] the formation and development of the United States.'" 37 The resolution was actually even more specific, stating that "the confederation of the original Thirteen Colonies into one republic was influenced by the political system developed by the Iroquois Confederacy as were many of the democratic principles which were incorporated into the Constitution itself."
38 As if that statement of the influence thesis weren't strong enough on its own, the resolution "acknowledge [d] This particular resolution did get limited attention in Congress. A Senate version had been introduced on September 16, 1987, 41 and, on December 2, 1987, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs held a hearing in the morning on the resolution, with the testimony and submitted statements coming almost entirely from proponents of the influence thesis.
42
The draft language of the resolution, at the time of that hearing, had provided that the confederation of the thirteen colonies "was explicitly modeled upon the Iroquois Confederacy." 43 That's the influence thesis in its most robust, and ridiculous, form-that the U.S. Constitution had its origins in the Iroquois Great Law of Peace.
44
Somebody must have realized that this was going way too far, however, despite testimony that would have supported such language. The Committee changed the wording before approving the resolution. " [E] xplicitly modeled upon the Iroquois Confederacy" was toned down to "influenced by the political system developed 39 Id.
40
Washington and Franklin were important presences at the Convention-Washington a brooding omnipresence, the aged Franklin, at the end of the Convention, summing up what had happened and supporting the compromises made along the way-but neither played a significant role in the details of the final document. In any event, we know Franklin's views of the Iroquois Confederacy from the unedited version of the Parker letter discussed earlier.
Washington's views about the Iroquois Confederacy were no more positive. At a hearing on the resolution, see S. Hrg. 100-610, Iroquois Confederacy of Nations, Hearing on S. Con. Res. 76 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. (Dec. 2, 1987), historian Donald Grinde provided "selected factual data" to support the influence thesis, including a quotation from a September 7, 1783, letter from Washington to James Duane: "I have been more in the way of learning the Sentimts. of the Six Nations than of any other Tribes of Indians." Reprinted in george washingTon: wriTings 535, 537 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997), and quoted in S. Hrg. 100-610, supra, at 137. That sounds nice, but Washington wasn't "admir[ing] the concepts of the . . . Iroquois Confederacy," as the resolution put it. He was writing about the possibility of war if attempts were made to displace the Six Nations. He was noting that he knew more about the possibility of their resistance to removal than he knew about how other tribes would react. See Marybeth Farrell, Untitled (Sept. 30, 1988) (State News Service dispatch, dateline Washington), available on LEXIS (quoting Alex Skibine, with name misspelled, deputy counsel for Indian Affairs for House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee). Skibine added that the language ultimately adopted was "general enough that people with different interpretations of history could have enough room for discussion." Id. Discussion yes, agreement no.
Some proponents of the influence thesis have written that the Senate voted to adopt the resolution in its original form, with the "explicitly modeled" language, and they've given great weight to that mythical adoption. See, e.g., Gregory Schaaf, Indian Great Law of Peace (Kaianerekowa) [hereinafter Schaaf, Encyclopedia], entry in 2 encycLopedia of american indian hisTory 410, 412 (Bruce E. Johansen & Barry M. Pritzker eds., 2008) (stating that the Senate voted in favor of the original language and that " [f] or the first time in history, Congress officially recognized that the U.S. government was 'explicitly modeled' after the Iroquois Confederacy"). In support of that made-up position, Schaaf cited to the Congressional Record for the day the Senate version of the resolution was introduced (September 16, 1987) , not the date the Senate voted, over a year later, after the language had been changed. The Senate website affirms, in response to a frequently asked question, that the Senate didn't take the vote Schaaf claimed it had. See http://www.sente.gove/ reference/common/faq/Iroquois_Constitution.shtml ("The answer is no" to the question, "Is it true that . . . [t] he Senate passed a resolution on September 16, 1787 [,] stating that the U.S. Constitution was explicitly modeled upon the Iroquois Constitution?").
50
See 134 cong. rec. 17433 (July 11, 1988 ii. fooTnoTe 9
Footnote 9 in the Developments chapter added more wishful thinking. In support of a textual reference to the "long history of tribal self-government," 61 that note said, "The Great Law of Peace, the constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy, was drafted [sic] Confederacy), a volume that bought into the influence thesis.
63 How do we know that August 1142-what a nice sense of precision!-was "perhaps" a key date? According to the Encyclopedia, it's because of oral tradition 64 -you know, passing stories from one generation to the next, with embellishment inevitably occurring along the way 65 -and tying certain events to solar eclipses, particularly one that occurred on August 31, 1142 (more precision!): "The Keepers speak of a Black Sun (total eclipse) that occurred immediately before the league was founded."
66
To be fair to the Encyclopedia folks, that volume didn't say anything about "drafting" the Great Law of Peace. The word "drafting" came from footnote 9. I'm not sure what the Harvard Law Review authors and editors thought "drafting" would mean in this context-wampum, perhaps, but translations of wampum weren't available to the American founders. What were the Harvard Law Review people thinking in letting this stuff appear in their pages?
Footnote 9 is perversely interesting also because, in demonstrating the "long history of tribal self-government," and after the reference to the year 1142, the authors wrote that " [o] ther tribes, like the Cherokee and Chickasaw, passed constitutions of their own in the early to mid-nineteenth centuries. . . . These constitutions [of the Cherokee, the Chickasaw, and the Choctaw Nations] often were the products of constitutional conventions and extensive thought by the tribes that drafted them." 67 That may be, but it's a big jump from 1142 to the nineteenth century.
If we were to conclude that some connection exists between the U.S. Constitution and tribal governing documents, and those tribal documents were drafted after the American founding, what is the chain of causation likely to have been? For that matter, the Great Law of Peace was reduced to writing not in 1142 or any other eclipse year, 68 but in the late nineteenth century. Mann, supra note 63, at 152. Mann notes, to her credit, that solar eclipses visible in the relevant part of North America also occurred in 1451, 1550, and 1654. Id. Even if the occurrence of an eclipse were really important in dating the Great Law of Peace, 1142 thus isn't the only possibility.
67
Developments, at 1710 n.9.
68
See supra note 66.
69
See Farrell, supra note 49 (quoting Ives Goddard, curator of Anthropology at the Smithsonian: " [T] he Great Law Documents . . . don't date to nearly a hundred years after the Constitution. The possibility has to be considered that the influence went the other way."); supra note 32 (noting significance of 1851 publication of Lewis Morgan's treatise). seem to me minimal, but others have more imagination-which "document" would have been the influencer and which the influenced?
iii. a few addiTionaL ThoughTs on The infLuence Thesis I've written before about the imaginary connection between the Great Law of Peace and the U.S. Constitution, 70 and I've been criticized by tribal officials for not understanding the concept of "cultural diffusion"-that, "[w]henever two cultures come into contact, an immense amount of information changes hands immediately." 71 The idea, I guess, is that the founders adopted Iroquois principles, with a high level of specificity, without realizing where those principles came from. That's close to a world record for implausibility.
It's also been said that we shouldn't be surprised when little or no documentation can be found to support the influence thesis: the events occurred over 200 years ago, hence the need to rely on oral traditions.
72 But the founding era is well documented. Not every piece of writing is trustworthy, of course, but if the founders were relying on ideas of the Iroquois Confederacy (or of any other American Indian nation), it's hard to imagine we couldn't find mention of that somewhere-in Madison's notes from the Constitutional Convention, in reports of debates in the state ratifying conventions, in the Federalist Papers, in newspapers or other contemporaneous tracts-something somewhere.
The rebuttal might be that no written record exists because the delegates to the Constitutional Convention wanted to keep the Indian influence secret. Most of them wanted ratification to occur, of course, and the document was doomed if it was understood to have been derived from the Iroquois. But that hypothesis presupposes a conspiracy of silence of breathtaking scope. Besides, if the purported source of constitutional principles would have caused ratification problems, why wouldn't the Anti-Federalists, some of whom were at the Convention, have noted this connection in their voluminous writings? If you're looking for ways to defeat the Constitution, why wouldn't you bring out the big guns-if the big guns exist? Historian Shannon sees the relationship between the founding documents and the Iroquois in a much more convincing way:
The Articles of Confederation and the United States Constitution . . . were decidedly anti-Iroquois in their ramifications: they assumed for the federal government exclusive powers in Indian affairs that made it impossible to turn back the clock and reinstitute the local diplomacy that had once sustained the council fire in Albany. . . . From the Indian perspective, the true legacy of the Albany Congress was the increasing See, e.g., Charles Radlauer, The League of the Iroquois: From Constitution to Sovereignty, 13 sT. Thomas L. rev. 341, 352 (2000) (ridiculing "Jensen's insistence upon written documentation two centuries after the fact"). I plead guilty. use of federal power to cement their dependency and removal in the new American republic.
73
I'll make one concession. The influence thesis is indefensible, but it's not only crazies who have supported one version or another of the thesis over the years. For example, the legendary Felix S. Cohen, usually given credit for creating the field of American Indian law in his masterful Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 74 could also engage in hyperbole:
For it is out of a rich Indian democratic tradition that the distinctive political ideals of American life emerged. Universal suffrage for women as well as for men, the pattern of states within a state that we call federalism, the habit of treating chiefs as servants of the people instead of as their masters, the insistence that the community must respect the diversity of men and the diversity of their dreams-all these things were part of the American way of life before Columbus landed.
75
Cohen went so far as to say that "what is distinctive about America is Indian, through and through," 76 a striking conception of American exceptionalism. Cohen was a serious scholar, but he wasn't above romanticizing the past with the goal of improving the future for the American Indian nations. How could he have known most of that pre-1492 history, including the "diversity of their dreams"? More oral traditions, I guess. And, although it isn't politically correct to say so, wars between American Indian tribes weren't unheard of over the centuries.
77 Diversity of men and dreams can go only so far.
iv. concLusion
The influence thesis shouldn't be taken seriously, in the pages of the Harvard Law Review or anywhere else, but that conclusion isn't intended to denigrate American Indian nations. In fact, if one has the interests of those nations in mind, it's risky to act as though a theory that is at best suspect and at worst nonsense is important to their status. American Indian policy doesn't depend on the validity of an ahistorical thesis. Almost thirty years ago, ethnographer Elizabeth Tooker noted that the influence thesis-under which white man's law is treated, in its fundamentals, as equivalent to traditional tribal law-actually denies the distinctiveness of American Indians:
Some recent interpretations of Indian cultures and history have turned this "negative prototype" on its head, asserting that, indeed, Indians did hold white ideals and . . . even that whites got them from the Indian. But as laudable as this might at first glance seem, such a positive stereotype exhibits not only as little fundamental understanding and appreciation of Indian cultures as a negative one, but also little understanding of Western culture. We owe our fellow residents on the continent better.
78
In seeking to emphasize the importance and distinctiveness of American Indian nations, proponents of the influence thesis may be doing exactly the opposite.
In any event, nothing is gained by endorsing the influence thesis, and what is lost is something we should all care about: the truth.
appendix: The incongruiTy aT The core of The Developments chapTer
The body of this article vents about the influence thesis. For anyone interested, I want to make a substantive criticism of the Developments chapter from the Harvard Law Review-in particular, the recommendation that tribal governments be given primary responsibility for interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act, even in habeas cases. It makes sense to defer to tribal governments on many issues, of course, but civil rights isn't necessarily one of them. Civil rights statutes are intended to protect individuals, and ICRA was intended to limit the powers of American Indian nations over tribal members. 79 Deferring to a government's interpretation of a statute intended to constrain that government isn't the intuitively right way to proceed. After all, during the civil rights era, when ICRA was enacted, southern officials claimed that state governments were the best judges of how their societies should be structured. But that system wasn't working well-to put it mildly.
I don't mean to liken today's tribal governments to Jim Crow-era state governments. But there's no reason to think tribal governments are inherently noble and unlikely therefore ever to engage in abusive behavior; human nature is human nature. That's why ICRA came into being: to protect tribal 78 Tooker, supra note 20, at 327.
79
The second section of ICRA, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302, is titled "Constitutional rights." Subsection (a) provides that " [n] o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall" engage in any of ten listed behaviors-generally a statutory application of most bill of rights provisions to American Indian tribes. The constitutional limitations would otherwise not be applicable. members-American citizens, after all-from overreaching by their own tribal governments.
80
That protection seems to require scrutiny of questionable governmental behavior by someone outside the tribal system. For the most part, however, ICRA has turned out to be a statement of aspirations rather than an enforceable legal document. The Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 81 -holding that, under ICRA, aggrieved tribal members have no recourse in federal court against their tribal governments, except in habeas cases-reduced the potential impact of ICRA dramatically.
82
If the only forum available to a tribal member who believes his civil rights have been abridged by a tribal government is tribal court-and that would be the result, even in habeas cases, of the Developments recommendations-the protections of ICRA aren't worth much to that member. A tribal court, if it exists at all, 83 isn't necessarily separate from other governmental branches-if other branches exist. (Tribes aren't required to have governments with separation of powers, and a tribal court therefore doesn't necessarily represent an independent judiciary.) The aggrieved tribal member's claim may thus be adjudicated by those, or the friends of those, accused of violating ICRA. The likely result is obvious.
Any discussion of ICRA's merits must be informed by a fundamental principle: neither states' rights nor tribal rights should trump individual rights.
80
Maybe other reasons were involved as well, but protecting individual rights was the stated motivation. 81 436 U. S. 49 (1978) . 82 The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo merely held that Congress hadn't made it explicit that federal courts should have jurisdiction over ICRA matters, except for habeas proceedings, where federal judicial review is provided for. See supra note 4. Without clear authorization, the Court said it wasn't going to infer federal jurisdiction. It's true that Congress wasn't explicit, but it would have been easy, I think, to infer that Congress intended that result. What otherwise was the point of ICRA? (On the other hand, in the intervening 38 years, Congress hasn't stepped in to reverse the effects of Santa Clara.) 83 The Developments chapter recognized that not all tribes have courts and suggests how that problem can be addressed for ICRA purposes. See Developments, at 1728.
